How should multilateral trade policy be designed in a world in which countries di¤er in terms of market access and technology, and …rms with market power di¤er in terms of productivity? We answer this question in a model of monopolistic competition in which variable markups increasing in …rm size are a key source of misallocation across …rms and countries. We use 'disadvantaged' to refer to countries with smaller market size, worse state of technology (in terms of higher innovation and average production costs), and worse geography (in terms of more remoteness from countries with better state of technology). We show that, in a global welfare perspective, optimal multilateral trade policy should: promote the sales of low cost …rms to all countries, but especially to disadvantaged ones; trim the sales of high cost …rms to all countries, but especially to disadvantaged ones; reduce …rm entry in all countries, but especially in disadvantaged ones. This would not only restore e¢ ciency but also reduce welfare inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged countries.
Introduction
How should multilateral trade policy be designed in a world in which countries di¤er in terms of free market access and technology, and …rms with free market power di¤er in terms of productivity? Should trade policy di¤er across countries? Should worse performing (national) …rms be protected from better performing (foreign) rivals? Should national product diversity be shielded against the potentially disruptive e¤ects of cheaper imported goods? The answers to these questions crucially depend on market structure, demand characteristics and technological constraints. In particular, in the 'canonical'models of monopolistic competition with CES demand, iceberg trade friction, sunk entry costs, …xed production costs and constant marginal costs that are (inverse) Pareto distributed across …rms, the free market equilibrium is e¢ cient and there is, therefore, no room for welfare improving policy intervention: free trade is the best multilateral trade policy. More precisely, e¢ ciency of the free market outcome is granted in models in which there is only the monopolistically competitive sector. When there is also another perfectly competitive ('outside good') sector, the relative size of the monopolistically competitive sector is in-e¢ ciently small due to markup pricing. Yet, as the markup is the same and constant across the monopolistic competitors, …rms' sizes are e¢ cient in both absolute and relative terms. This implies that the ine¢ ciently small size of the monopolistically competitive sector materializes entirely through an ine¢ ciently small number of …rms (see, e.g., Melitz and Redding, 2014 and .
The aim of the present paper is to show how all this ceases to hold once the CES assumption is removed, leading to new implications in terms of multilateral trade policy aimed at maximizing the joint welfare of all trade partners. In doing so, we focus on a speci…c deviation from CES known as 'Marshall's Second Law of Demand' (MSLD), according to which demand becomes more inelastic with consumption (Mrazova and Neary, 2016) . We show that under this assumption the free trade allocation of resources fails to be e¢ cient in terms of product range, product selection and product mix with the extent of misallocation varying across countries depending on market size, state of technology and geography. For conciseness, we use 'advantaged'('disadvantaged') to refer to countries with larger (smaller) domestic market size, better (worse) state of technology in terms of lower (higher) innovation and average production costs, and better (worse) geography in terms of more (less) close proximity to countries with better (worse) state of technology. Our …ndings can then be summarized as follows. First, from a welfare point of view, too many products are sold to advantaged countries and too few are sold to disadvantaged ones (ine¢ cient product range). Second, conditional on range, relatively too many high cost products are sold to any country (ine¢ cient product selection). This ine¢ciency is, however, more severe for disadvantaged countries. Third, conditional on range and selection, the quantities of high cost products sold to any country are too large and those of low cost products are too small (ine¢ cient product mix). Also this ine¢ ciency is more severe for disadvantaged countries. As a result, the free market provides an ine¢ ciently high degree of welfare inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged countries. There is, therefore, room for welfare improving multilateral policy intervention that: increases sales of low cost …rms to all countries but especially to disadvantaged ones; decreases sales of high cost …rms to all countries but especially to disadvantaged ones; reduces …rm entry in all countries but especially in disadvantaged ones.
In our analytical framework market ine¢ ciency stems from four types of externalities (Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto, 2014; Dhingra and Morrow, 2016; Behrens et al, 2016) . First, …rms neglect their impact on product variety. Due to 'love of variety', the product range enters utility as a direct utility-enhancing argument on top of the quantities consumed. This acts as a driver towards too few products. Second, by keeping price above marginal cost, …rms leave too much room for entry. This acts as a driver towards too many varieties. Third, …rms neglect the negative impact of their entry on rivals' pro…ts. This also acts as a driver towards too many varieties. These three externalities are the traditional ones already highlighted in earlier models of monopolistic competition (Spence, 1976; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) and operate also when …rms are not heterogeneous. Their net e¤ect on product range is generally ambiguous depending on the cross elasticities of demand. A special case arises with CES demand: the opposite externalities exactly o¤set each other so that the free market outcome is e¢ cient (without the 'outside good'). The introduction of …rm heterogeneity does not alter this property as CES demand implies the same constant markup for all …rms so that also the product mix is e¢ cient (Melitz and Redding, 2015) . The presence of this fourth type of externality is thus tied to MSLD. The fact that demand becomes more inelastic with consumption is re ‡ected in larger markups for …rms with lower marginal cost. As a result, these …rms do not fully trasmit their cost advantage to prices. By softening competition, this generates a positive externality in favor of …rms with higher marginal cost. The externality works at the intensive margin: higher marginal cost …rms are ine¢ ciently large relative to lower marginal costs …rms. It also works at the extensive margin: by keeping price above marginal cost more than their higher marginal cost rivals, lower marginal cost …rms leave ine¢ ciently larger room for entry. Hence, with MSLD but not with CES, …rm heterogeneity becomes an additional driver of ine¢ ciency.
Analyzing the MSLD case is important in many respects. As pointed out by Mrazova and Neary (2016) , Marshall (1920) argues this case represents the normal behavior of demand, an opinion shared also by Spence (1976) , Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1979) . Subsequent studies have vindicated this view. MSLD plays a crucial role for some of the key traditional (non-CES) implications of trade models with monopolistic competition, including: 'procompetitive'e¤ects, through which trade liberalization reduces …rms'markups (Krugman, 1979) ; 'pricing to market', through which …rms set c.i.f. prices in each market they sell to rather than simply setting a single f.o.b. price in the market they sell from (Krugman, 1987) ; 'dumping', through which …rms accept a lower pro…t margin per unit sold in foreign than in home markets (Brander and Krugman, 1983) ; and incomplete 'pass through', through which changes in …rms'production costs traslate in less than proportionate price changes (Dornbusch, 1987). 1 MSLD also underpins some newer implications of those models in the presence of …rm heterogeneity: better performing …rms (those with lower marginal cost and higher market shares) set higher markups, and their passthrough rate is lower than worse performing …rms (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008;  Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano, 2014 and 2016). Last but not least, several of the implications of MSLD are supported by mounting empirical evidence on …rm performance based on price data (Berman, Martin and Mayer, 2012 ; De Loecker and Goldberg, 2014; De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal and Pavcnik, 2016) as well as on revenue data 2016) . 2 We perform our normative analysis of the free market outcome within the general equilibrium framework proposed by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) . This model with an 'outside good' and quasi-linear quadratic utility exhibits several features useful for our purposes. 3 As it exhibits linear demand, it satis…es MSLD and thus features pro-competitive e¤ects, pricing to market, dumping, and incomplete pass-through as well as higher markups and lower pass-through rate for better performing …rms. As it is analytically solvable with asymmetries in market size, technology and accessibility for an arbitrary number of countries, it allows for transparent comparative statics in a multi-country setup. As the marginal utility of income is constant and utility is trasferable, it allows for a consistent e¢ ciency analysis based on a straightforward de…nition of global welfare for an economy with heterogeneous countries as the sum of all individuals' indirect utilities. While one may note that the absence of income e¤ects gives our investigation some partial equilibrium ‡avor, the framework still shares its focus on social surplus with a large body of trade policy analyses that abstract from distributive issues (Bagwell and Staiger, 2016) .
Our analysis contributes to three main literatures. The …rst is the literature on optimal trade policy under imperfect competition (Grossman, 1992) . 4 This literature usually does not feature more than two countries. Its …ndings with homogeneous …rms are summarized by Felbermayr, Jung and Larch (2013): tar-i¤s can correct for the distortion due to markup pricing (Flam and Helpman, 1987) ; tari¤s can induce welfare-enhancing additional entry (Venables, 1987) ; tari¤s can improve the terms-of-trade (Gros, 1987) . 5 More recently, …rm heterogeneity has been introduced in models of monopolistic competition. When demand is CES as in Melitz (2003) (Felbermayr, Jung and Larch, 2013) , trade barriers have bene…cial e¤ects on the protectionist country. By raising the country's wage, an import tari¤ 2 Due to its far-reaching implications, MSLD has also attracted renewed interest in the contemporary debate on the qualitative and quantitative e¤ects of trade liberalization, though often disguised under di¤erent headings: "log-concavity in log-prices" (Arkolakis et al, 2015) ; "sub-convexity" (Neary and Mrazova, 2016); "increasing relative love of variety" (Zhelobodko et al, 2012) ; "decreasing elasticity of substitution" (Bertoletti and Epifani, 2014) ; "Adjustable pass-through" (Fabinger and Weyl, 2014) . See Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2016) for a discussion of mappings between these concepts. 3 Irrespective of quasi-linearity, as pointed out by Ossa (2011) , models with a freely traded 'outside good' generate a perfectly elastic labor supply curve and thus isolate the e¤ects of trade policies on …rm location. Models with no 'outside good' generate, instead, a perfectly inelastic labor supply curve and hence isolate the e¤ects of trade policy on the terms of trade. 4 For a recent overview of optimal trade policy under perfect competition, see the introductory discussion in Costinot, Donaldson, Vogel and Werning (2015). 5 Flam and Helpman (1987), Gros (1987) and Venables (1987) all rely on variants of the CES two-country model by Krugman (1980) . In a multi-country set-up involving the six major players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations (Brazil, China, the EU, India, Japan, and the US), Ossa (2011) shows that a calibrated version of that model predicts noncooperative tari¤s of the same order of magnitude as the tari¤s observed during the tari¤ war following the Smoot-Hawley. produces an improvement in its terms-of-trade. When product variety is inef-…ciently poor a tari¤ on imports, or a subsidy to domestic sales, increases the number of varieties o¤ered by the market also correcting the mark-up distortion. Non-CES demand à la Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) is considered by Bagwell and Lee (2015) , who show that in the case of two symmetric countries there is an incentive for a country to introduce a small unilateral import tari¤. They also identify the conditions under which two symmetric countries have unilateral incentives to introduce beggar-thy-neighbor export subsidies. Moreover, in the case of symmetric trade policies, they …nd that global free trade is generally ine¢ cient. Within the same framework but without the outside good, Demidova (2016) shows that a unilateral reduction in a 'wasteful'import tari¤ (i.e. a frictional tari¤ that does not generate any tax revenue) increases the protectionist country's welfare both in the case of two large economies and in the case of a small open economy. Di¤erently, when the import tari¤ is 'non-wasteful'(i.e. it generates tax revenues as in the other foregoing studies), in both cases unilateral trade liberalization reduces the country's welfare. Our contribution to this literature is the analysis of multilateral trade policy for an arbitrary number of asymmetric countries that cooperatively maximize global welfare with non-CES demand. 6 The second literature we contribute to studies optimal product variety in models of monopolistic competition without …rm heterogeneity (Spence, 1976, and Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) and with …rm heterogeneity (Dhingra and Morrow, 2012; Melitz and Redding, 2014; Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto, 2013 and 2014). This literature focuses on a closed (or 'perfectly integrated') economy or on open economies with symmetric countries. 7 We extend this literature by investigating the role of country asymmetries in terms of market size, geographical barriers to trade and state of technology.
Third and last, we contribute to the growing literature on 'misallocation'in the wake of Hsieh and Klenow (2009), who use a closed economy CES model of monopolistic competition to show how output and capital distortions give rise to 'wedges' in marginal revenue products between …rms, and how the welfare losses from those distortions can be quanti…ed through the measurement of the corresponding wedges. As discussed by De Loecker and Goldberg (2014), trade policies fall nicely into this framework. While output tari¤s and subsidies distort output markets due to their e¤ects on competition, input tari¤s and subsidies directly distort capital and intermediates markets. With CES demand and no 'outside good', reducing these distortions through trade liberalization necessarily improves welfare through a more e¢ cient allocation of resources across …rms. Our contribution to this literature is to show that, when demand is non-CES, free trade is not e¢ cient and trade liberalization does not necessarily improves welfare. In particular, with asymmetric countries there are situations in which trade liberalization may actually increase the misallocation of resources towards less productive …rms and countries. This can happen because the global welfare maximizing trade policy is not free trade.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and derives the free market outcome. Section 3 characterizes the e¢ cient outcome. Section 4 compares the two outcomes, discussing the ine¢ ciency of the former in terms of product range, product selection and product mix. Section 5 describes the multilateral trade policies that can be implemented to attain e¢ ciency at the market equilibrium. Section 6 concludes.
Multi-Country Economy
We follow Melitz and Ottaviano (2008, Appendix) and consider a global economy consisting of M countries, indexed by l = 1; :::; M . Country l is populated by L l consumers, each endowed with one unit of labor, inelastically supplied in a perfectly competitive labor market. Preferences of consumers in l are de…ned over a 'traditional'homogeneous good 0 and a continuum of varieties of a horizontally di¤erentiated 'modern'good. We use l to denote this continuum and index varieties by i 2 l . All consumers share the same utility function
where q " 0l and q " l (i) refer to the individual consumption levels of the traditional good and variety i of the modern good respectively. Parameters , and are all positive: is a measure of 'love for variety'; and measure the intensity of preferences for the modern good relative to the traditional one. All consumers have an initial endowment q " 0l of the traditional good, which is assumed to be large enough for its consumption to be strictly positive.
Labor is the only input. It is employed in the production of the traditional good under perfect competition and constant returns to scale with unit labor requirement equal to one. It is also employed in the production of the modern good under monopolistic competition. In country l the supply of a variety of this good faces two type of costs: a sunk 'innovation'requirement of f l > 0 units of labor to design the blueprint of the variety; and a 'production'requirement of c units of labor per unit of output. The latter is drawn from a continuous distribution with cumulative density function
This corresponds to the (empirically relevant) case in which marginal productivity 1=c is Pareto distributed with shape parameter k 1 over the support [1=c M;l ; 1). For k = 1 the distribution is uniform on its support [0; c M;l ]. As k rises, density is skewed towards the upper bound of the support. In the limit, as k goes to in…nity, the distribution becomes degenerate at c M;l . Accordingly, c M;l can be interpreted as an inverse measure of country l's 'absolute advantage'in the modern sector; c M;h =c M;l as a measure of country l's 'comparative advantage'in that sector with respect to country h; and k as a measure of the strength of this comparative advantage.
Exchange of varieties of the modern good is hampered by 'iceberg frictions' for international shipments: lh > 1 units have to be shipped from country l for one unit to arrive in country h 6 = l. These frictions are determined by geographical and technological factors. Crucially, they are not trade policy variables. National shipments do not face, instead, any friction ( ll = 1).
Market Outcome
In the equilibrium consumers maximize utility subject to their budget constraints, …rms maximize pro…ts subject to their technological constraints (for both production and trade), and all markets clear. Choosing the traditional good as numeraire, perfect competition in its market together with free trade implies that both its price and the wage of workers equals one in all countries. 8 Quasi-linearity of utility (1) then implies that workers decide how much to spend of their unit wage on the varieties of the modern good, leaving whatever residual budget to the consumption of the traditional good. The …rst order condition for utility maximization gives individual inverse demand for variety i
for q " l (i) 0, with p l (i) denoting the price of variety i in country l and Q " l = R i2 l q " l (i) di denoting total individual demand of the di¤erentiated varieties. Aggregation of (3) across consumers leads to aggregate demand of variety i in country l
where the set ;l is the largest subset of l such that demand in l is positive for variety i, N l is the measure ('number') of varieties in ;l (given by the sum of domestic and imported varieties), and p l = (1=N l ) R i2 ;l p l (i) di is their average price. Variety i belongs to this set when
where p max l represents the price at which demand for a variety in l is driven to zero.
Product Mix
Turning to modern …rms, pricing to market arises from price discrimination on a geographical basis with …rms setting c.i.f. prices in each market they sell to. We use q lh (c) to denote the quantity sold in country h by a …rm producing in country l at marginal cost c and p lh (c) to denote the corresponding c.i.f. price (h = l refers to domestic transactions). Maximization of pro…ts earned from sales to h are achieved for q lh (c) equal to
where 'm'labels equilibrium variables and Q m
is the total quantity of modern good sold in country h with N E;h denoting the number of entrants in country h. Expression (6) de…nes a cuto¤ rule as only entrants in country l with low enough marginal cost (c c m lh ) sell their variety to country h. For them, the pro…t-maximizing c
Then (6) 
Product Selection
Due to free entry, in equilibrium expected pro…t for an entrant in country l is exactly o¤set by the sunk cost f l . Given (2), (7) , (8) and hh = 1, this 'free entry condition'can be stated as
where lh ( lh ) k is an inverse measure of trade frictions from l to h ('trade freeness') ranging between 0 for prohibitive international frictions and 1 for frictionless national trade ( ll = 1). Together with analogous conditions for the other M 1 countries, (9) yields a system of M equations that can be solved for the M equilibrium domestic cuto¤s for l = 1; :::; M , where jP j is the determinant of the trade freeness matrix P = [ hl ] (h = 1; :::; M ; l = 1; :::; M ) and jC hl j is the cofactor of its hl element. 10 This shows that …rm selection in the modern sector is stronger (c m ll is smaller) in countries that have larger market size (larger L l ) and that are 'closer' to countries (including themselves) with better state of technology in terms of both innovation (smaller f l ) and production (smaller c M;h ) -with 'closeness'dictated by the trade freeness matrix through the inverse of
These are all factors that make competition tougher. Henceforth, for conciseness, we will refer to such countries as 'advantaged'and to the others as 'disadvantaged'.
Product Range
To complete the characterization of the free market outcome, we need to pin down the equilibrium numbers of entrants (N E;l ), producers (N P;l ) and sellers (N l ) in each country. For the number of sellers (which determines the 'product range'), we can use c m
for l = 1; :::; M . The key result here is that product variety is richer in countries with lower c m ll . Given (10), these are the advantaged countries. Hence, as in these countries consumers face not only lower prices (as already discussed) but also richer product variety, welfare is higher as captured by indirect utility
Finally, to …nd the equilibrium number of entrants, it is useful to note that the number of sellers from country h to country l equals N hl = N E;h G h (c hl ) (i.e. the share of entrants with marginal cost lower than the cuto¤) so that, given (2), (8) and N l = P M h=1 N hl , the equilibrium number of sellers in l also evaluates to N m l =
This can be combined with (11) to obtain, for l = 1; :::; M , a system of M linear equations that can be solved for the equilibrium number of entrants
The corresponding equilibrium number of producers is then given by N m P;l = N m E;l (c m ll =c M;l ) k . Accordingly, there are more entrants and producers in advantaged countries as their cuto¤ c m hh is lower. 
E¢ cient Outcome
To evaluate the e¢ ciency of the free market outcome we consider the problem faced by a benevolent social planner who maximizes global welfare taking as given, for each country l, the endowment of labor L l , the endowment of the traditional good q 0l = q " 0l L l , trade frictions and the production functions of the two goods. In the case of the modern good, this means that the planner takes as given the mechanism determining each variety's unit labor requirement c as a random draw from the distribution G l (c) after f l units of labor have been allocated to the design of that variety. As the quasi-linearity of (1) implies transferable utility, global welfare W can be expressed as the sum of consumers' utilities across all countries: W = P M h=1 U l L l . For each country l the planner's choice variables are then: the quantity of the traditional good (q 0l = q " 0l L l ); the number of varieties designed (N E;l ); and the quantity of each variety earmarked by country of consumption h (q lh (c) = q " lh L h ). Accordingly, the planner's program can be summarized as
subject to the resource constraint
where the third term on the left hand side is overall labor employment in the production of the modern good, taking the distribution of c and iceberg frictions lh into account. Analogously, given (1), in U l L l we can use
Product Mix
The …rst order condition with respect to q lh (c) gives 
for l; h = 1; ::::; M . The relation is, therefore, the same same as for the free market equilibrium (see (8)), even though the cuto¤s are di¤erent as we now show.
Product Selection
The cuto¤s of the planner are derived from the …rst order conditions of the planner's problem with respect to N E;l . These require 
for l = 1; :::; M . 12 This shows that, as in the free market outcome, e¢ cient product selection is stricter (c o ll is smaller) in advantaged countries.
Product Range
As for the number of sellers (and thus the 'product range'), we can use the de…nition of c o lh from (16) 
for l = 1; :::; M . As the e¢ cient number of varieties consumed in l also evaluates to
is the same for all …rms selling from l to h and there is thus no 'misallocation' in the sense of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) . Compare with Footnote 9 on 'misallocation'at the free market outcome. 1 2 For the market outcome we focused on situations in which the modern sector is active in all countries, which requires to obtain, for l = 1; :::; M , a system of M linear equations that can be solved for the e¢ cient number of entrants
with l = 1; :::; M . The corresponding equilibrium number of varieties produced in l is then given by N o P;l = N o E;l (c o ll =c M;l ) k . Analogously to the free market outcome, more varieties are designed (N o E;l is larger) and produced (N o P;l is larger) in countries with lower c o ll . There product variety is also richer (N o l is larger). Given (18) , these are again the advantaged countries. Given that indirect utility can be written as
such countries enjoy higher welfare.
Market Failure
We are now ready to compare the free market and e¢ cient outcomes in terms of product selection, product mix and product range.
Product Selection
Product selection is determined by cuto¤ (10) in the free market case and by cuto¤ (18) 
As this shows that c m ll is larger than c o ll , the planner is more selective than the free market: the share of varieties designed but not produced by the planner is larger than the share of entrants that produce in equilibrium. In particular, varieties with c 2 (c o ll ; c m ll ] are supplied by the free market but should not be produced from an e¢ ciency viewpoint. The length of the interval of ine¢ ciency c m ll c o ll decreases as c o ll falls. It is, therefore, shorter in advantaged countries. Hence, these countries in the free market outcome not only enjoy higher welfare, but are also less ine¢ cient in terms of product selection. Vice versa, disadvantaged countries face not only lower welfare but also more ine¢ cient product selection at the free market outcome.
Ine¢ cient selection also materializes in terms of exports. Using (10), (18), (8) and (17) which implies c o lh < c m lh . Hence, the share of varieties produced but not exported is smaller for the planner than for the free market. Speci…cally, varieties with c 2 (c o lh ; c m lh ] are exported in the free market outcome but they should not be exported on e¢ ciency grounds. Conditional on bilateral friction lh , this ine¢ ciency is more severe in export countries with larger cuto¤ c o hh . These are disadvantaged countries that not only produce an ine¢ ciently larger share of varieties they design, but also import an ine¢ ciently large share of varieties produced elsewhere. On the other hand, conditional on the destination country's cuto¤ c o hh , the ine¢ ciency is more pronounced for shipments to destinations associated with lower lh and thus easier to reach.
Product Mix
Turning to output, comparing the free market outcome from (6) 
As this is negative and holds for any c and c 0 in [0; c o lh ], the distribution of quantities supplied by the planner is always more skewed towards varieties with low unit labor requirement than the distribution at the free market outcome. However, using (8) hh . This implies that the ine¢ ciency in the distribution of quantities is more severe in disadvantaged than in advantaged countries. The former countries, therefore, not only produce ine¢ ciently larger shares of the varieties they design and import ine¢ ciently larger shares of varieties produced elsewhere, but they also feature a more ine¢ cient product mix biased towards varieties with higher unit labor requirements.
Product Range
The range of products consumed in country l are given by (11) and (19) for the free market and the planner respectively. Given c m ll = 2 1 . The free market product range is, therefore, ine¢ ciently narrow (wide) for large (small) c o ll . Accordingly, the free market makes too few varieties available in disadvantaged countries, and too many varieties available in advantaged countries. This does not imply however that consumption of the modern good is ine¢ ciently low in the former and ine¢ ciently high in the latter. Using (2), (6), (16) , (17) and (18) to compute country l's average quantities q m h and q o l consumed in the free market and e¢ cient outcomes respectively, the gap in per-capita consumption of the modern good turns out to be
As this is negative, in the free market outcome all countries consume an ine¢ciently low per-capita amount of the modern good, the more so the larger c o ll . Hence, the under-consumption is more severe in disadvantaged countries. The same holds for the average per-capita consumption of modern varieties as the corresponding gap evaluates to
The fact that all individuals in all countries consume ine¢ ciently little of the modern good implies that the global supply of that good must be ine¢ ciently small. Given q m l = q m hl and q o l = q o hl for all h, (24) also implies that in the free market outcome trade per capita is ine¢ ciently low at the intensive margin, especially for disadvantaged countries. 13 Given N hl = N E;h hl (c ll =c M;h ) k , (13) and (20) imply that also the extensive margin of trade is ine¢ ciently low towards these countries. It is, however, ine¢ ciently high towards advantaged countries.
International Inequality
There are, …nally, implications in terms of welfare inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged countries. From (12) and (21) we have that 1) ] with the second equality granted by (2) . As this does not depend on the country of production l, we then have that it is also the average quantity consumed in h : q m h = q m lh . Analogously, for the e¢ cient outcome we get:
larger (smaller) than U m l for high (low) c o ll -or equivalently high (low) c m ll . 14 This implies that in the free market outcome disadvantaged countries su¤er from ine¢ ciently low welfare levels whereas advantaged countries enjoy ine¢ ciently high welfare levels. The free market thus provides an ine¢ ciently high degree of welfare inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged countries.
Distortions and Externalities
The comparison between free market and e¢ cient outcomes in terms of product selection, product mix and product range shows that the free market errs in all three dimensions. First, as the share of entrants that produce in equilibrium is larger than the share of varieties designed but not produced by the planner, the free market is less selective than the planner. As the share of varieties produced but not exported is larger for the free market than the planner, ine¢ ciently weak selection in equilibrium a¤ects also exports. This ine¢ ciency is more pronounced in disadvantaged countries.
Second, as the supplied quantity of varieties with lower (higher) unit labor requirement is smaller (larger) for the free market than the planner, the free market o¤ers a sub-optimal product mix that is not skewed enough towards lower cost varieties. This holds for both locally produced and imported varieties. A corollary is that, for given unit labor requirement, the free market product basket gives ine¢ ciently large weight to imported vs. locally produced varieties and, among these, to varieties coming from distant vs. close countries (as, due to iceberg frictions, imported varieties have higher delivered cost than locally produced ones, and imported varieties have higher delivered cost from distant than close countries). Also this ine¢ ciency is more pronounced in disadvantaged countries.
Third, the free market provides an ine¢ ciently narrow (wide) range of varieties to disadvantaged (advantaged) countries. Nonetheless, all countries consume an ine¢ ciently low per-capita amount of the modern good due to the dominant impact of ine¢ ciently low average per-capita consumption of varieties. These ine¢ ciencies are again more severe in disadvantaged countries. As a corollary, the fact that in all countries individual consumption of the modern good is ine¢ ciently low implies that also the global supply of that good is ine¢ ciently low.
The source of ine¢ ciency lies in four types of externalities (Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto, 2014; Dhingra and Morrow, 2016; Behrens et al, 2016). Three of them are at work even in the absence of …rm heterogeneity and do not require MSLD. These are the ones highlighted in early models of monopolistic competition (Spence, 1976; Dixit and Stilglitz, 1977 ). On the one hand, 'love of variety' for the modern good implies that the product range enters utility as a direct argument on top of the quantities consumed. This …rst type of externality acts as a force tending towards too few varieties since …rms do not take into account their positive impact on the product range when deciding to enter and serve any given market. On the other hand, there are two types of externalities that act as forces tending towards too many varieties. By keeping price above 1 4 Given (12), (21) and (22) , the welfare gap marginal cost, …rms leave more room for entry in the free market equilibrium than it would happen under (implicit) marginal cost pricing associated with the planner's outcome. Moreover, when …rms enter the market, they do not consider their negative impact on rivals'pro…ts.
In general, the net e¤ect on product range is ambiguous as it depends on the cross elasticities of demand. A special case arises with CES demand. Without the traditional good, the opposite externalities exactly o¤set each other so that the free market and e¢ cient outcomes coincide. With the traditional good ('outside good'), the free market still provides the e¢ cient product range but, due to markup pricing, supplies an ine¢ ciently small amount of each variety. The modern good is, therefore, under-supplied relative to the traditional one. The fact that CES implies the same markup for all …rms determines the ef-…ciency of the product mix between locally produced and imported varieties. The introduction of …rm heterogeneity does not alter these properties (Melitz and Redding, 2015) .
The fourth type of externality materializes, instead, in the presence of …rm heterogeneity and, crucially, MSLD. The fact that demand becomes more inelastic with consumption is re ‡ected in larger markups for …rms with lower marginal cost so that these …rms do not fully trasmit their cost advantage to prices. 15 This generates a positive externality in favor of …rms with higher marginal cost. The externality works at the intensive margin: higher marginal cost …rms are ine¢ ciently large relative to lower marginal costs …rms. It also works at the extensive margin: by keeping price above marginal cost more than higher marginal cost rivals, lower marginal cost …rms leave ine¢ ciently larger room for entry. This applies both to domestic and foreign rivals. Hence, with MSLD but not with CES, …rm heterogeneity becomes an additional driver of ine¢ ciency.
A lower cuto¤ reduces these distortions. By reducing the prices of all …rms but disproportionately those of …rms with lower marginal cost and larger markup, it forces these …rms to trasmit more of their cost advantage to prices. 16 This explains why welfare is higher in advantaged countries where sellers face lower cuto¤s.
Optimal Multilateral Policy
The analysis in the previous section has drawn a complex map of market failures. There are several ways in which the free market outcome departs from the ef-…cient outcome, in terms of product selection, product mix and product range. Moreover, the extent (and sometimes also the direction) of the departures is country or …rm speci…c. We will now characterize the tools that national policy makers can use cooperatively to make the market achieve the e¢ cient outcome in a decentralized fashion. For this to happen, we will need to give the policy makers an unconstrained choice of tools ('…rst best'), including country-speci…c and variety/…rm-speci…c consumption/production subsidies/taxes as well as lumpsum transfers for consumers and …rms. We will then comment on what policy makers could achieve when deprived of the use of variety/…rm-speci…c consump- 1 5 The markup on sales from h to l of a …rm with marginal cost c is hl (c) = c m ll hl c =2. tion/production subsidies/taxes ('second best'). These are the most demanding tools in terms of informational content that governments can realistically access.
First Best Policies
The e¢ cient outcome can be decentralized through country-pair variety speci…c per-unit transfers s hl (c) subsidizing (taxing) trade of low (high) marginal cost varieties from country h to country l (l = 1; :::; N ), complemented by country-speci…c lump-sum taxes on …rms' pro…ts in h and consumers' incomes. For international trade from h to l 6 = h, per-unit subsidies can indi¤erently take the form of export subsidies in the production country or import subsidies in the consumption country. Analogously, per-unit taxes can indi¤erently be export taxes in the production country or import tari¤s in the consumption country. For domestic trade within country h, per-unit transfers can indi¤erently take the form of production subsidies (taxes) for local …rms or consumption subsidies (taxes) for local consumers. In any case, due to the externalities discussed in the previous section, free trade is not e¢ cient and restoring e¢ ciency requires policy tools that vary across countries and …rms. One size does not …t all.
Per-Unit Transfers
Per-unit transfers are needed to remove the product mix distortion. Consider quantity q hl (c) supplied to country l by a …rm producing in country h at marginal cost c. Let s & hl (c) and s hl (c) denote per-unit consumption and production transfers earmarked to that quantity. Given (4) which shows that the distinction between per-unit consumption and production transfers is immaterial from the perspective of pro…t maximization. Accordingly, for parsimony we introduce the bundling notation s hl (c) s & hl (c) + s hl (c). The pro…t-maximizing quantity then evaluates to
which is non-negative as long as c is not larger than the cuto¤ c s hl , i.e. the value of the marginal cost such that
The e¢ cient outcome is achieved when the corresponding price . Hence, trade by low cost …rms is subsidized whereas trade by high cost …rms is taxed. Equivalently, low cost varieties enjoy export or import subsidies whereas high cost varieties face export taxes or import tari¤s. In both cases transfers are bigger for more distant shipments (larger hl ) to disadvantaged countries (larger c o hl ). For shipments to any given country l, the average per-unit transfer across all …rms and countries is
which is larger for smaller disadvantaged countries. 17
Lump-Sum Transfers
Lump-sum transfers are needed to deal with the distortions in product selection and product range. Let S h be a lump-sum transfer for …rms in country h. It is a subsidy if positive and a tax if negative. Given (25) , (26) and (28), the maximized pro…t earned on quantity supplied to l by a …rm producing in h at marginal cost c evaluates to
The 'free entry condition'in country h can then be stated as
which by (2) and (17) can be rewritten as
For l = 1; :::; M this yields a system of M equations that can be solved for the M equilibrium cuto¤s Comparing (30) with (18) reveals that decentralization of the e¢ cient outcome requires to set S h = f h . Being negative, this amounts to a country-speci…c lump-sum tax on …rm pro…t (T h = f h ), which is higher in disadvantaged countries as these face higher innovation costs. These lump-sum transfers also implement the e¢ cient numbers of entrants, producers and sellers in each country. Given (26) and (25) , s hl (c o hl ) = 0 implies p max l = c o ll . This, together with de…nition (5) and average price p o l = [k=(k + 1)]c o ll , yields the e¢ cient number of entrants (19) . 18 E¢ ciency can also be gauged from the fact that, as discussed in Section 4.3, the e¢ cient number of sellers is alternatively given
Then, the derivation we followed for the free market outcome implies that also the number of entrants is the e¢ cient one N o E;l . The same holds for the number of producers as this is given by
To close the characterization of e¢ cient decentralization, we need to check whether the revenues from the lump-sum taxes on …rms'pro…ts together with those from the per-unit taxes on high marginal cost …rms are enough to …nance the per-unit subsidies to low marginal cost …rms. This can be done by computing the aggregate net per-unit transfers across all …rms and countries. These aggregate transfers total
where the second equality is granted by the free entry condition (29) and the term between brackets is the average transfer for quantities produced in l and sold in h. 19 As S o is positive, per-unit taxes do not generate enough revenues to cover per-unit subsidies. Moreover, given T l = f l , S o = 2 P M l=1 f l N o E;l implies that aggregate net per-unit transfers P M l=1 T l = P M l=1 f l are twice as large as aggregate tax revenues from lump-sum taxes on …rm pro…ts. This de…cit can be …nanced through an additional lump-sum tax on consumers equal to
Hence, the de…cit generated by per-unit trasfers is equally shared between producers and consumers. Note, however, that the payments of lump-sum pro…t taxes are earmarked by production country whereas the distribution of the burden of lump-sum consumption taxes is immaterial due to the absence of income e¤ects. The reason for this di¤erence is that the former are used to correct distortions while the latter only for budget balance. 20 
Second Best Policies
The decentralization of the e¢ cient outcome requires to set trade subsidies and taxes that di¤er not only across countries but also across varieties produced at 1 8 The average delivered price quoted by …rms producing in h for sales to l is de…ned as
. By (2) this evaluates to p hl = [k= (k + 1)] hl c o hl , which in turn by (17) can be rewritten as p hl = [k= (k + 1)]c o ll . As this does not depend on the country of production, averaging across countries of production gives p l = p hl . 1 9 See footnote (17). 2 0 Which countries run the bigger de…cit per capita before consumer taxation is not a well de…ned question as it is indeterminate whether subsidies (taxes) should come in the form of export subsidies (taxes) in the country of origin or import subsidies (taxes) in the country of destination. di¤erent marginal cost. As the implied informational requirement is substantial, it is interesting to analyze what is achievable when subsidies and taxes can vary across countries but not across shipments made by …rms between the same country pair. When this is the case, policy makers do not have enough tools to remove all distortions. In particular, as they have to use the same per-unit transfer s lh for all shipments from country l to country h, they lack the speci…c tools needed to target the product mix distortion.
In this second best scenario, policy makers implement the 'constrained'optimal allocation of a planner who cannot a¤ect the relation between quantity and cuto¤ dictated by (6) . This planner thus maximizes welfare (14) , subject not only to the resource constraint (15) but also the product mix constraint (6) , with respect to the choice variables q 0l , N E;l and c lh (instead of q lh (c)) for l; h = 1; :::; M . Solving this maximization problem shows that 'constrained' e¢ cient product selection is ruled by the cuto¤ for i; j = 1; ::::; M , with the relation between domestic and foreign cuto¤s given once more by c co hl = c co ll = hl . Pro…t maximization also determines the 'constrained'e¢ cient number of entrants as
with associated number of producers N co P;l = N co E;l (c co ll =c M;l ) k and product range N co l = P M h=1 hl N co E;h (c co ll =c M;h ) k . The 'constrained'e¢ cient outcome exhibits similar properties as the free market and ('unconstrained') e¢ cient outcomes. In particular, also the 'constrained'planner follows a cuto¤ rule: only varieties with low enough marginal cost (c c co lh ) are produced in country h for consumption in country l. The cuto¤ marginal cost c co lh is lower in advantaged countries. Moreover, conditional on the countries of production and consumption, varieties with lower unit labor requirement c are supplied in larger amounts, the more so the lower the cuto¤ in the country of consumption.
The cuto¤ is, however, larger for the 'constrained' planner than for the free market outcome and even larger than for the 'unconstrained' planner: c co ll = [2 (k + 1) = (2k + 1)] 1 k+2 c m ll = [4 (k + 1) = (2k + 1)] 1 k+2 c o ll . This way the 'constrained' planner partially compensates the product mix distortion with larger consumption of the modern good. Accordingly, the 'constrained'e¢ cient outcome can be decentralized through a per-unit trade subsidy common to all …rms selling to the same given country l s co l = 1 2 (k + 1) c co ll ;
matched by a lump-sum pro…t tax common to all …rms producing in the same given country h equal to T co h = f h =(2k + 1) for all h; l = 1; :::; M . The perunit trade subsidy is thus larger for supplies to disadvantaged countries, which however face also higher lump-sum pro…t taxes due to higher innovation costs.
Comparing the …rst and second best policy tools reveals that the 'constrained' e¢ cient per-unit trade subsidy s co l is smaller than the average 'unconstrained' e¢ cient per-unit trade subsidy s o l . The aggregate 'constrained' e¢ cient trade subsidy corresponding to (31) which is k + 2 times larger than aggregate revenues from lump-sum pro…t taxation as these are equal to P M l=1 f l N co E;l =(2k + 1). This implies that …rms bear less than half of the subsidy burden with the rest …nanced by lump-sum taxes on consumers.
Conclusion
We have addressed the question how multilateral trade policy should be designed in a world in which countries di¤er in terms of market access and technology, and …rms with market power di¤er in terms of productivity. We have argued that, in general, the answer depends on market structure, demand characteristics and technological constraints. In the 'canonical' models of monopolistic competition with CES demand, iceberg trade friction, sunk entry costs, …xed production and constant marginal costs that are (inverse) Pareto distributed across …rms, the free market equilibrium is e¢ cient. Accordingly, free trade is the best multilateral trade policy and there is no room for welfare improving policy intervention.
This property of the free market equilibrium does not carry on to monopolistic competitive models in which demand is not CES. We have argued that an important departure from CES materializes when demand satis…es 'Marshall's Second Law of Demand' (MSLD), according to which demand becomes more inelastic with consumption. We have shown that, in a model with linear demand satisfying MSLD, the free trade allocation of resources is ine¢ cient in terms of product range, product selection and product mix, and that the extent of in-e¢ ciency varies across countries depending on market size, state of technology and geography.
We have used the term 'disadvantaged' to refer to countries with smaller market size, worse state of technology (in terms of higher innovation and average production costs), and worse geography (in terms of more pronounced remoteness from countries with better state of technology). We have found that, from a global welfare viewpoint, optimal multilateral trade policy should act as follows. On the one hand, to remove the product mix ine¢ ciency, it should promote the sales of low cost …rms to all countries, but especially to disadvantaged ones. It should also trim the sales of high cost …rms to all countries, but especially to disadvantaged ones. On the other hand, to simultaneously remove the product range and product selection ine¢ ciencies, it should reduce …rm entry in all countries, but especially in disadvantaged ones. This would not only restore e¢ ciency but also reduce welfare inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged countries.
Such an optimal trade policy requires to set trade subsidies and taxes that di¤er not only across countries but also across products supplied at di¤erent marginal cost. As the implied informational requirement is substantial, we have also analyzed what is achievable in a less demanding scenario in which subsidies and taxes vary across countries but not across …rms. In this case, the product mix ine¢ ciency cannot be targeted speci…cally and the resulting 'constrained' optimal trade policy should (partially) compensate the welfare loss due to the product mix distortion with larger consumption of all products, especially in disadvantaged countries.
